Socially Useless? The Crucial Contribution of Finance

to Economic Life by Booth, Philip Mark & Zuluaga, Diego
SOCIALLY
USELESS? 
The Crucial Contribution of Finance 
to Economic Life
IEA Discussion Paper No. 87
By Philip Booth and 
Diego Zuluaga
February 2018
With some exceptions, such as with the publication of lectures, IEA 
Discussion Papers are blind peer-reviewed by at least one academic or 
researcher who is an expert in the field. As with all IEA publications, the 
views expressed in IEA Discussion Papers are those of the author and not 
those of the Institute (which has no corporate view), its managing trustees, 
Academic Advisory Council or senior staff.
A modified version of this paper will be published in the Journal of New 
Finance, published by Universidad Francisco Marroquín. 
The IEA’s Financial Services Unit acts as the focal point for our research, 
events, media commentary and outreach in the field of banking and 
financial services.
1Contents
About the authors
Executive summary
Introduction
Criticisms of the financial sector
What are the functions of the financial sector? 
Is the financial sector useful in practice?
Are financial markets short-term oriented? 
Is the financial sector ‘duping’ consumers and investors?
Does financial sector growth harm economic 
growth? 
Does the financial sector create inequality?
Are complex financial instruments the real problem?
Is financial speculation self-serving and socially 
damaging?
Conclusion
References
2
5
7
9
11
15
17
23
27
31
33
37
45
49
2About the authors
3Philip Booth is Professor of Finance, Public Policy and Ethics and Director 
of Research and Public Engagement at St. Mary’s University, Twickenham 
(the UK’s largest Catholic university). He is also Senior Academic Fellow at 
the Institute of Economic Affairs where, from 2002-2016, he was Academic 
and Research Director. Previously, Philip has worked for the Bank of 
England and as Associate Dean of Cass Business School. He has written 
widely on investment, finance, social insurance and pensions as well as on 
the relationship between Catholic social teaching and economics. Books 
have included Catholic Social Teaching and the Market Economy. Philip 
is a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, a Fellow of the Institute of 
Actuaries and an honorary member of the Society of Actuaries of Poland. 
Diego Zuluaga is Head of Financial Services and Tech Policy at the 
Institute of Economic Affairs. He was educated at McGill University and 
Keble College, Oxford, where he earned degrees in economics and 
finance. Diego is a frequent contributor to UK print and broadcast media, 
as well as a visiting lecturer in economics at the University of Buckingham.
4
5Executive summary
• Animosity towards the business of finance is ancient and persistent. 
Because finance creates intangible value, its contribution to society is 
still invisible to many observers – including former regulator Lord Turner, 
who described large swathes of the sector as ‘socially useless’.
• Such claims are unfounded and dangerous. Not only that, but the oft-
proposed remedy – increased statutory regulation – may heighten rather 
than mitigate the exposure of taxpayers and households to recessions 
and speculative bubbles.
• Financial firms serve many useful functions which individuals and 
households could scarcely undertake on their own. These functions 
include maturity transformation, matching lenders and borrowers at low 
cost, facilitating the transfer of risk and consumption across time and 
between people, monitoring, and diversification of investments.
• The best analogy for the financial sector is probably supermarkets. It 
would be possible to prepare dinner by visiting a chicken farmer to buy 
a chicken, a market gardener to buy a cabbage, and so on. But such 
a process would be very time-consuming and involve high opportunity 
costs. Banks reduce the transaction costs of financial activity, enabling 
people to spend their time more productively.
• Gross value added (GVA) by the UK financial sector amounted to £124 
billion in 2016. Of this, 50 per cent is exported. Contrary to the claims of 
critics, the sales and trading activity which is alleged to be self-serving 
accounts at most for 10 to 13 per cent of financial services business in 
Britain.
• It is often argued that private-sector finance is short-term oriented. Whilst 
there is some evidence that shareholders may be heavily discounting 
distant profits, the reasons for this could be policy uncertainty and not 
irrationality as is commonly suggested. Moreover, the valuations of 
tech firms – whose positive cash flows lie far in the future – and low 
6yields on corporate bonds suggest that investors are patient by historical 
standards.
• Much financial regulation is based on the notion that, in a free market, 
providers ‘dupe’ consumers. But regulatory intervention is often grossly 
miscalculated. The Financial Conduct Authority’s recent interest cap on 
payday loans shrank the market by between three and five times more 
than the regulator expected. Markets are not perfect, but regulation is 
often a very poor substitute.
• The much-cited literature linking financial growth and adverse economic 
outcomes is simply too crude to warrant drawing clear policy conclusions. 
Studies linking financialisation with inequality are similarly ambiguous: 
the top ten countries for their share of finance in GDP are a mixture of 
high-, medium- and low-inequality countries.
• Complex financial instruments and speculation, both unpopular in the 
wake of the 2008 crash, are not harmful on their own. In fact they help to 
transfer risks to those who can best bear it, whilst giving greater income 
certainty to vulnerable people. Until and unless the value of finance is 
properly understood, public policy will fail to harness its benefits and may 
well endanger public welfare.
7Public animosity towards the business of finance is ancient and persistent. 
Ignorance of fundamental features of finance, such as risk and the 
opportunity cost of money, led the medieval Christian church to proscribe 
or severely constrain the charging of interest, as Muslim clerics still do. 
This, in turn, fuelled prejudice against people who, pushed out of other 
occupations and less constrained by their own creeds, became financiers. 
Matters have improved since the time of Shakespeare’s Shylock. But 
suspicion of finance persists and is periodically stoked by financial 
crises and other events. Because finance creates intangible value, its 
contribution to society is still invisible to many observers – including, even, 
the prominent former financial regulator, Lord Adair Turner, who famously 
claimed that (much) financial activity is ‘socially useless’. 
Such claims are unfounded and dangerous.
They are unfounded because a closer look at financial activity in developed 
countries reveals that little of it is unrelated to customer needs. They are 
dangerous because the doctrine that the financial sector is useless beyond 
an arbitrary threshold may lead to policies that restrict people’s ability to 
lend, borrow and insure themselves or raise the costs of those activities.
And relying on statutory regulation to address the perceived problems 
of finance, as is typically suggested, may heighten rather than mitigate 
the exposure of taxpayers and households to adverse events such as 
recessions and speculative bubbles. It may also encourage financiers to 
develop instruments that are designed not to serve customers’ needs but to 
get around or profit from increasingly complex regulations. Much is indeed 
wrong with the current finance industry. But government intervention is 
responsible for many of the problems.
This is what we argue. But first we need to review the complaints of those 
who doubt the social value of finance. 
Introduction
8
9Criticisms of the financial sector
In 2009, Lord Adair Turner claimed that the financial sector had become 
too big, much of what went on in it being ‘socially useless’. He pointed 
to ‘fixed income securities, derivatives, trading and hedging, and possibly 
also asset management and share trading’ as areas that were oversized. 
Though he emphasised that it was difficult for a regulator to know in 
advance which activities it would be beneficial to restrict, he did suggest 
a tax on financial activities to reduce the size of the financial sector to its 
optimal level (Turner 2009).
Lord Turner is not unusual in his dim view of finance. Attacks come from 
many quarters. In a speech to the United Nations in 2015, Pope Francis 
said: ‘beginning in 2008 the trend of food prices has changed: doubled, then 
stabilized, but always with higher figures in comparison to the preceding 
period. […] we cannot overlook financial speculation: for example, the 
high prices of wheat, rice, corn, soy, which fluctuate on the stock market, 
perhaps they are linked to profits and, therefore, the higher the price the 
greater the profit.’1 Archbishop Welby of the Anglican Church has called for 
a financial sector that serves society rather than rules it.2 
In a book that was acclaimed widely on the left, political scientist David 
Marquand criticises the financial sector and its growth, blaming financial 
firms for inequality and rent seeking (Marquand 2015). Zingales (2015) also 
argues that successful rent-seeking by financial firms has over-expanded 
the sector, backed up by ill-designed regulation and financial guarantees 
from the government. Both Marquand and Zingales suggest that the US is 
the most extreme example of financial sector over-expansion. 
1  See: https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/june/documents/
papa-francesco_20150611_fao.html 
2  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/banks-must-serve-society-
not-rule-it-says-incoming-archbishop-justin-welby-8451320.html
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Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) have followed a different approach, more 
rooted in positive economics than political economy. Their results lead them 
to accept that a deepening of the financial sector is important for economic 
growth. But they argue that, at a certain size, it becomes detrimental to the 
real economy. 
Lack of confidence in the financial sector also comes from financiers 
themselves, who often describe the value of what they do in an apologetic 
way. For example, Banking on Trust3, produced by a group of leading 
bankers, fund managers and other financial professionals, argues that 
the banking sector should exist to serve the real economy, implying that 
it currently fails to do so and that financial services have no value in 
themselves beyond channelling capital to industry. 
Neither the critics mentioned above nor any other reasonable person doubt 
that some financial activities are socially useful. But they seem to have 
a limited understanding of how finance benefits society and, as a result, 
mistake valuable financial services for merely self-serving or parasitic 
practices by financiers.
To expose this error, we first rehearse the fundamental functions of 
financial services. Then we consider some of the more difficult cases, such 
as those referred to by Lord Turner, and explain the value they provide to 
their consumers. That these complex products provide value should come 
as no surprise. If they were worthless, why would they exist? This is the 
first question you might expect critics of these products to answer. In fact, 
they do not address it at all. 
3  http://www.meteos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/BankingFutures-Report-1-
February-2016.pdf 
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‘A large part of what we think of as economic activity is designed to 
accomplish what high transactions costs would otherwise prevent’ 
Ronald Coase, Nobel Prize Lecture, 1991
Financial markets and institutions broadly fulfil the following functions (see, 
for example, Levine 2005):
• Maturity transformation: enabling borrowers to borrow over 
long terms whilst savers can access their funds easily
• Reducing the cost of matching lenders and borrowers
• Facilitating money transfers and payments
• Monitoring investments and corporate governance after 
finance has been provided
• Risk reduction through diversification
• The transfer of different forms of risk to those who wish to 
hold them
• The transfer of consumption across time
The traditional description of the function of banks and the financial 
system more generally is that they resolve a ‘constitutional weakness’ 
in the economy (Hicks 1939). Some households seek a secure and 
generally liquid method of saving, while other households and companies 
need a secure source of funds, which they often need to access for long 
periods. Banks can lend long term while managing deposits in such a 
way that households can always have access to them, thus achieving the 
maturity transformation which is valuable to both. Securities markets do a 
similar job. Debt and equity instruments are mechanisms through which 
companies raise funds. Those securities provide liquidity for the saver 
because ownership rights can be traded on secondary markets. 
What are the functions of the 
financial sector?
12
Financial institutions reduce transaction costs
Financial institutions exist to reduce the cost to businesses of raising capital 
and the costs to individuals of postponing consumption. The institutions 
involved in this process include pension funds, banks, investment trusts, 
mutual funds, investment banks, insurance companies and myriad 
alternative finance providers. Financial institutions specialise in reducing 
transactions costs such as the cost of screening the risk of the ventures 
in which people are investing, the cost of finding entities that want capital, 
the costs of transferring ownership of investment interests and the costs 
of diversification. Innovation in the financial system should be seen in the 
context of its potential usefulness in performing these functions.
Thanks to the existence of financial markets, households can spread 
risk across a range of institutions and also across a range of potential 
borrowers. Risks can be pooled so that investors are less exposed to the 
failure of individual investment projects. If investment takes place through 
institutions, the investor need only analyse the soundness of the institution 
and not of the underlying investments. 
Financial intermediaries can also monitor and discipline risk taking on a 
continual basis. Banks can monitor companies that have borrowed from 
them when deciding whether to continue lending (Diamond 1984). And 
purchasers of securities (particularly of equities) can discipline corporate 
executives by exercising voting rights or by selling shares. 
All the above functions reduce transaction costs of various types. The 
financial system also reduces transaction costs in the narrow sense of 
making it cheaper to transfer a financial interest from one person to another. 
Through the use of standardised, and often tax-efficient, securities sold on 
exchanges (or ‘second hand’ markets), financial institutions allow people 
to access their capital at any time. The bank deposit system allows the 
transfer of financial interests in a similarly efficient way. Without the ability 
to transfer ownership in this way, the cost of capital to companies would be 
much greater and households would be reluctant to save.  
Banks, in particular, organise their business in a way that facilitates money 
transmission for the purpose of exchanging goods, services and financial 
interests. Banks could involve themselves in money transmission alone 
(narrow banking), without being involved in lending money to businesses 
and other households. However, in most banking systems, the roles of 
money transmission, bank lending and financial intermediation go hand-
in-hand. The cost of alternatives to transmitting money in this way would 
be prohibitive. 
13
Financial institutions, like institutions in other markets, are continually 
evolving and subject to innovation. Recently, peer-to-peer lending networks 
have emerged, enabling households to diversify their risk while omitting the 
intermediary partly or entirely. Mobile money transfers have developed in 
Africa as a way to transfer money without using the banking sector, which 
has been difficult for households and businesses to access efficiently 
(see Mbiti and Weil 2011). In China, 2,000 platforms intermediate £100 
billion of peer-to-peer lending (Weinland 2017). Exchange traded funds 
allow extraordinary degrees of diversification of investment portfolios with 
minimal cost to the investor. 
In addition, insurance companies reduce the risks faced by households 
and companies. They do this by pooling the insured risks and also, to a 
limited extent, by transferring the risks from the insured party to the owners 
of the insurance company.
The best analogy for the financial sector is probably supermarkets. It would 
be possible to prepare dinner by visiting a chicken farmer to buy a chicken, 
a market gardener to buy a cabbage, another farmer to buy some potatoes, 
and so on. However, such a process would be incredibly time consuming 
and involve the sacrifice of a huge amount of real economic activity. Like 
financial institutions, supermarkets exist to reduce transaction costs.
A thought experiment is useful in communicating the benefit of finance. 
Imagine an unintermediated system in which a household wished to save 
for retirement and to protect against the risk of the main earner dying. The 
latter is almost impossible to envisage. The former would be extremely 
costly.4 The household would need to analyse different investment projects, 
taking a lot on trust. The household would be able to invest in only two or 
three projects. To liquidate an investment, the household would need to 
undertake complex legal processes, if indeed it were possible at all. Saving 
for retirement would be much riskier and probably impossible for all but the 
very wealthy. 
The financial sector makes possible for everybody activities that in the past 
were possible only for the wealthiest. It is a pro-poor industry.
4  This is why, in the old days, for poor households the only – imperfect – way of 
providing for old age and the early death of the breadwinner was to have lots of children 
and to have them early.
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When we drill down into the financial sector, its social usefulness becomes 
clearer. Of the total value added by the UK financial sector – £124 billion 
in 2016 according to Tyler (2017) – approximately 50 per cent is exported. 
Although there are also imports of financial services, the UK has a huge 
trade surplus in the sector of £44 billion or 3 per cent of national income 
(ibid.). Even if the financial services output of the UK economy is socially 
useless, the fact that much of it is exported, thus providing the income 
to buy other services and consumer and investment goods, significantly 
reduces the power of that argument. And, it raises the question of why 
people in other countries would buy financial products that are useless. 
Financial services provide just over 3.1 per cent of all the jobs in the UK 
despite producing 7.2 per cent of gross value added in the economy.5 The 
UK’s financial sector is one of the economy’s most productive, and its 
retrenchment since the crisis explains some of the stagnation in productivity 
growth during that period. Compensation in the financial sector, at 6.9 per 
cent of all compensation, is in line with the sector’s contribution to value 
creation, despite frequent media accounts to the contrary.
The financial services sector is also diverse, contrary to images conjured 
up since the financial crisis of an industry that mainly produces opaque and 
complex products. For example, approximately a fifth of the UK financial 
sector is made up of insurance services and pension funds, which are 
important for protecting against household and business risks and for 
providing income protection in old age (Burgess 2011). 
It is difficult to measure the recorded value of the set of services to which 
commentators such as Turner refer when they discuss the social utility of 
5 https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/compendium/
unitedkingdomnationalaccountsthebluebook/2015-10-30/chapter02theindustrialanalyses 
Is the financial sector useful in 
practice?
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the sector. Recent analysis by consultancy Oliver Wyman (2016) suggests 
that sales and trading activity constitutes 10 to 13 per cent of all gross value-
added (GVA) by the UK financial services sector. Some of that is not the 
sort of short-term speculative activity which critics of finance usually have 
in mind, but even if all of it were objectionable, attempts to argue that this 
activity overwhelms or distorts the economy are enormous exaggerations. 
On the contrary, retail and business banking, asset management, 
insurance and market infrastructure form the bulk of financial services in 
Britain, together accounting for over 80 per cent of financial services GVA.
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Because securities are turned over many times during their lives and 
are often owned for short periods of time, investment markets are often 
thought to be ‘short-termist’. However, there is a great deal of confusion 
in discussions of short-termism. There are three quite different aspects of 
this criticism which tend to be conflated. The first involves supposed short-
termism on the part of investors and shareholders, who, it is said, discount 
future cash flows at high rates and thus value future cash flows a lot less 
than they value cash flows closer to the present (Haldane 2011).6 
Secondly, there is the alleged short-term orientation of managers of 
companies, driven by quarterly performance measurement, which has 
nothing to do with discount rates and all to do with reporting requirements 
and managers’ remuneration.7 If this is a problem, the long-term investment 
may still take place (because it will add value to the company), but the 
company might be managed badly, with a focus on short-term numbers, 
such as immediate turnover and profit. Finally, there is the question of 
fund managers turning over securities rapidly, only holding them for a 
short period of time and looking for returns in the short term. The policy 
implications, if any, of the three aspects of this question are different.
Myopic investors
The first of the three allegations is the most serious because, if true, it 
would distort investment in the real economy. Haldane (2011) suggests that 
investor short-termism is driven by myopia, but that is only one possible 
cause of the apparent high discount rate companies apply when deciding 
whether to invest in new projects with distant cash flows. More distant pay-
offs involve greater risk and uncertainty, as conditions may change before 
longer-term investment provides positive cash flows. 
6  There may be, in the language of behavioural economics, ‘hyperbolic discount-
ing’ by investors, or their rates of time preference may have changed.
7  Investor short-termism will, in an efficient market where agents act in the interest 
of principals, also be reflected in short-termism by managers. But manager short-ter-
mism in this case is only a symptom – they are doing what the owners want.
Are financial markets short-term 
oriented?
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However, even assuming that Haldane’s hypothesis is true, are investors 
irrationally myopic or do they simply have a rational preference for nearer-
term cash flows? The mere fact that investors discount more distant profits 
at higher interest rates tells us nothing. It would, for example, be expected 
that investors would develop relatively stronger preferences for nearer-
term cash flows as the population ages. 
Alternatively, increased policy uncertainty relating to the regulatory 
environment in which firms are operating might increase risk premiums that 
investors demand for investments with longer-term payoffs. Baker et al. 
(2016) suggest that the finger of short-termism should be pointed at central 
banks such as the Bank of England. They find that policy uncertainty, a 
very important source of which is government institutions, is associated 
with greater stock price volatility and reduced investment and employment 
in a range of sectors. Their findings apply to the United States as well as 
to other large economies.
If the driver were irrational myopia, there might be scope for policy 
intervention in the form of a choice architecture that enables individuals to 
better understand future versus present cash flows (Thaler and Sunstein 
2003). But if rational investor preferences have simply shifted, then there 
is no ground for policy intervention. If the cause is government policy 
uncertainty, then the solution is to reform and reduce intervention by 
government – or, at least, to ensure that the framework in which policy is 
determined is coherent and consistent.8 
But, we should question the whole idea of the alleged short-term focus 
of financiers. If we look at the history of investment from the 19th century 
onwards, irrational myopia did not seem to be an obvious problem. Even 
in the early 21st century, it could be argued that there was over-investment 
rather than under-investment in more speculative and long-term ventures 
such as the tech sector – indeed, this seemed to replicate the pattern of 
19th century railways investment.9 
Looking at current-day trends, it is difficult to draw the conclusion that 
investors are myopic. Venture capitalists take on average five years to exit 
their investment via mergers and acquisitions and seven years for initial 
public offerings (CB Insights 2013). Twitter, for instance, took 77 months 
8  Recent examples of how government action might have raised the cost of capital 
include the UK government’s policy of imposing price caps on energy companies and 
a whole array of actions in relation to the residential rented housing market such as 
increases in transactions taxes, limits on the deductibility of interest from financing costs, 
and regulations implemented in the name of tenant protection.
9  For an excellent discussion of this see Miller (2003).
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from first funding to listing on the public market. Seventy-five per cent 
of Amazon’s market value is justified by profits anticipated more than a 
decade hence.10 Indeed, there is a whole sector of investment markets 
described as ‘unicorns’ which contains start-up companies with a market 
value of over $1 billion. There are around 250 such companies, with a 
combined market value of around $750 billion. In other words, investors 
are being patient and attaching a high value to uncertain long-term profits.
In the UK, regulation might discourage investments with risky long-
term returns. Most notably, the regulation of pension funds discourages 
equity investment. However, there is certainly no clear evidence of 
irrational preferences for short-term cash flows: a 16-year bond issued by 
GlaxoSmithKline currently has a gross redemption yield of only 2.5 per 
cent. Those who suggest that investors are short-termist must demonstrate, 
firstly, that investors do demand higher returns from long-term projects 
and, secondly, that this is not an expression of genuine preferences or 
caused by existing government policy. In relation to the first, the evidence 
is unconvincing, and in relation to the second, non-existent.
Short-termist management
What about the behaviour of company managers? Are they obsessed with 
results in the next quarter instead of focusing on the long-term prosperity 
of the business? Unfortunately, regulation in the EU and in the UK has 
encouraged or required quarterly reporting, though such regulations 
have now been relaxed. Whether quarterly reporting really does make 
a difference to investment is a moot point. Nallarreddy et al. (2017), for 
example, suggest otherwise. 
However, as discussed in Sternberg (2004) the purpose of corporate 
governance is to ensure that the agents (managers) fulfil the objectives 
of the principals (owners). If the objectives of the owners are long term, 
owners should develop corporate governance arrangements that reflect 
that. In turn, stock exchanges are incentivised to develop rules for quoted 
companies that lower the cost of capital, thus providing an environment 
which is conducive to companies issuing shares and having them traded 
on the exchange (see Arthur and Booth 2010). Unfortunately, legislation 
and corporate governance codes that focus on information provision, 
including those relating to fair value accounting, may encourage managers 
to pursue short-term objectives contrary to the interests of shareholders 
(see Kay 2012). Historical experience suggests that the solution is to 
10  See: https://www.economist.com/news/business/21717069-firms-are-
increasingly-accused-failing-look-ahead-misdiagnosis-corporate 
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allow owners and stock exchanges the maximum freedom to develop the 
framework of rules that ensure managers are accountable to owners in 
the ways preferred by owners (Stringham 2015). This may mean relaxing 
existing government regulation which requires a short-term focus from 
managers.
Short-termist trading
When it comes to the rapid turnover of securities as a supposed 
manifestation of short-termism, it is also difficult to make a convincing case 
that this is a problem, though it is asserted that the phenomenon leads 
to owners who are less engaged with the company. While it is difficult to 
calculate a figure for the average holding period of a share, a few months is 
often suggested.11 It is questionable how relevant this is. Many of the trades 
that lead to such a low average are undertaken by particular investors who 
add liquidity and reduce anomalies within markets but whose function is 
not to invest the capital of savers. On the other hand, passive (index) funds 
hold 13 per cent of the market and seek to minimise turnover so as to lower 
fund charges.12 
Moreover, there is a tradeoff between patient capital deployed to generate 
cash flows over the long run, and the need for accurate price signals and 
price discovery by agents. In other words, efficient markets require short- 
as well as long-term-oriented participants. In fact, efficient markets tend 
to benefit unsophisticated investors, especially those invested in passive 
funds, because such investors cannot hope to benefit easily from the 
mispricing that might occur in less liquid markets. 
Holding shares for short periods of time is not an inevitable feature of 
financial markets, as is demonstrated by two of the most admired types 
of investing currently in operation: value investing of the sort undertaken 
by Warren Buffett, and venture capitalism which focuses on innovative 
firms. Neither can be described as short-term-oriented. Buffett’s Berkshire 
Hathaway has an average holding period of one year, with 20 per cent of 
its stocks held for longer than two years (Hughes, Liu and Zhang 2010).
However, let us assume that fund managers are interested in short-term 
capital gains from shares and that this is behind the tendency to turn 
11  For an interesting discussion of the issue in relation to the US market see: http://
www.politifact.com/virginia/statements/2016/jul/06/mark-warner/mark-warner-says-
average-holding-time-stocks-has-f/ 
12  See: https://www.economist.com/news/business/21717069-firms-are-
increasingly-accused-failing-look-ahead-misdiagnosis-corporate
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shares over quickly. The question in which the fund manager is interested 
is ‘what actions by the company will lead to short-term capital gains?’. The 
answer to this question depends on investors’ views about the different 
value of long-term versus short-term projects and cash flows. This simply 
takes us back to the discussion above. If investors like long-term projects, 
investing in short-term projects will be bad for a share’s value and lead 
fund managers to sell the share. The debate about the turnover of shares 
adds nothing to the discussion.
Perhaps the shareholder-owned PLC model is narrowly focused and does 
not give rise to good long-term stewardship by shareholders. Diversity in 
ownership structures, which could involve employee ownership or different 
classes of shares which might have different rights attached depending on 
the length of time for which they are held, might be beneficial.13 Although 
the public shareholder model has proved remarkably resilient over time, 
there should certainly be no regulatory impediment to such diversity of 
ownership structures.
The most obvious policy response should be to remove those regulations that 
encourage rapid turnover of shares and short-term metrics in management 
reporting. Indeed, even the Kay Review (Kay 2012), which took a sceptical 
view of modern investment management techniques, argued that the long-
term ownership of shares was discouraged by regulation such as quarterly 
reporting, mark-to-market accounting and the way regulators monitor risk 
and set capital for insurers and pension funds.
Given the unintended consequences of so much legislation in this field, the 
government itself should take a more patient approach. A more stable policy 
framework would help long-term investment. Regulations that penalise 
insurance companies and pension funds for holding instruments other than 
government bonds and which penalise risk taking should be removed. And 
regulations that require managers to report regularly to shareholders using 
metrics that can be highly volatile are an unnecessary intervention in the 
relationship between shareholders and managers. 
13  Some of these issues are discussed in Keohane (2013). 
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Zingales (2015) has argued that financial firms are harming consumers and 
investors through mis-selling. This is the justification for a large amount of 
consumer finance regulation in the UK. 
Zingales suggests that such ‘duping’ can take the form of predatory sales, 
whereby customers are sold products they do not understand and would 
not buy if they did, and of bundle sales in which one of the components in 
the bundle is harmful but overlooked by unsophisticated buyers.
There are two facets to this focus on ‘market failures’ and ill-served 
consumers. The first is what economists would call a ‘joint hypothesis’ 
problem. We do not have unregulated consumer financial markets. In 2011 
alone, the UK financial regulator introduced regulation or issued guidance, 
advice, discussion documents or consultations totalling 4.3 million words. 
This is more than five times the number of words in the Bible. This output 
included a 585-page consultation on the regulation of the mortgage market, 
which then led to a 312-page document on regulations relating to the sale 
of mortgages in 2012. 
Given this reality, we cannot know whether it is the market or compliance 
costs and reduced competition caused by regulation that are the problem 
– or whether the vagaries of the market and the problems of regulation 
reinforce each other. Most importantly, we also cannot know in advance 
whether regulation will improve a market. The perfectly informed regulator 
is just as much a textbook fiction as the perfectly informed consumer. 
Consider the case of predatory lending in the market for payday loans. 
Because of its political salience, there are many empirical studies of the 
welfare effects of this form of credit. Yet the evidence is mixed. Payday 
loans appear to increase bankruptcy rates among marginal borrowers 
(Skiba and Tobacman 2008). On the other hand, payday loans appear to 
make it easier for people to meet unexpected expenses (see Morse 2011). 
Is the financial sector ‘duping’ 
consumers and investors?
24
When the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) placed an interest rate cap 
on payday loans in 2015, it expected the volume of loans to drop by 11 
per cent and the number of payday customers to decline by 21 per cent. 
The actual figures in the first year of operation of the cap were 56 and 53 
per cent, respectively. Given that the FCA’s intervention was calculated 
(on the basis of behavioural modelling) to only lead to the exclusion from 
the market of payday borrowers who were deemed to be harmed by the 
loans (FCA 2014), there is little doubt that some people who benefited 
from borrowing have now been shut out of the market. Indeed, the typical 
payday borrower is now somebody who is better-off and who borrows for 
longer than before the intervention. Some people at the lower end of the 
income scale who can no longer borrow but for whom payday loans might 
have been important in emergencies have been hurt by the cap.
This particular regulatory intervention has had detrimental consequences 
because it is impossible to design regulation that only targets perceived 
problems whilst leaving well-functioning parts of the market unaffected. 
Regulators simply do not have the knowledge to be able to distinguish 
between people who will benefit and those who will suffer from the 
regulation and the interventions cannot be sufficiently fine-tuned. This 
is in the nature of markets and regulators. Many other unintended 
consequences of regulation stem from seeing markets in a static context. 
In fact, markets are dynamic entities in which participants are continually 
looking for improvements on the status quo. 
The dynamics of financial markets are demonstrated by developments in 
asset management. This is often cited as a market that fails customers. 
Indeed, the UK government recently introduced a price cap in the pensions 
fund management market (see Booth and Davies 2015). The problem 
that is often highlighted is that actively managed mutual funds tend to 
underperform their benchmarks over long periods while charging higher 
fees than passive funds. Research shows that 90 per cent of active fund 
managers fail to outperform.14 There is a powerful case that putting savings 
into a mutual fund is a fool’s errand if there are cheaper alternatives (see 
Bogle 2007).
Yet, the emergence of cheaper alternatives is precisely what has occurred 
as evidence of the sub-optimality of active investing has mounted. As of 
2016, index tracker funds accounted for 28.5 per cent of assets under 
management in the United States.15 This is up from less than five per cent 
14  https://www.ft.com/content/e139d940-977d-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582 
15  See http://uk.businessinsider.com/moodys-investor-services-report-on-active-
and-passive-investment-2017-2?r=UK&IR=T 
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twenty years ago. The creation of index funds was a direct consequence 
of the development of portfolio theory and the efficient markets hypothesis 
(Markowitz 1952; Fama 1970).16 It is a clear case of the modern financial 
theory, which is often criticised, improving real-world outcomes. Exchange 
traded funds are a derivative innovation, which now allow extraordinary 
degrees of diversification into asset classes such as infrastructure and 
venture capital at costs of around 0.1-0.3 per cent of fund values. This is 
perhaps one-tenth of the level of fund charges 20 years ago. 
Figure 1. Trends in fund charges for index-tracking funds
Source: Financial Conduct Authority (2017)
Regulators tend to take a snapshot view of markets, rather than viewing 
them as an evolutionary process which, through competition, innovation 
and trade, leads to better outcomes over time. The static view of financial 
markets biases regulators in favour of intervention, because it fails to 
consider that perceived imperfections act as a spur for innovation and new 
entry. 
The Financial Conduct Authority’s (2017) report on competition in the asset 
management industry, for instance, raises concerns about fund charges 
by active managers, which are found to be clustered and to have changed 
little since 2005. Does this mean that competition in asset management 
is limited? It is difficult to argue that it is, given the aforementioned growth 
of index funds, whose charges are declining rapidly. Moreover, the value 
proposition of active managers is not a low price but the outperformance of 
a benchmark. If investors continue to patronise them even in the presence 
16  Bogle (2007) gives an account of how studying under Paul Samuelson motivated 
him to consider the potential of a tracker fund.
26
of cheap indexed alternatives, the only conclusion is that they believe 
that their particular manager will outperform. The costs and benefits of 
that decision are born by investors themselves, so there are no obvious 
grounds for intervention.
Any market requires a degree of information asymmetry to develop 
dynamically. What spurs individuals to inform themselves, thereby putting 
downwards pressure on prices, is the fact that the uninformed pay more. 
Ryanair travellers can thank those who check in luggage and buy food 
on board for at least part of their consumer surplus. The same is true for 
current account add-ons such as unauthorised overdraft fees.
This is not to suggest that a situation where consumers are uninformed is 
better than one in which they are better informed. There might be particular 
regulatory interventions that will increase welfare in consumer financial 
markets beset by information asymmetries. But the starting point should 
be a realisation that markets are institutional settings in which information 
is discovered and communicated. 
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In recent years, it has been suggested that having a large financial sector 
is a drag on growth. Famously, George Osborne wanted to rebalance 
the economy away from finance and towards manufacturing. In his 2012 
Budget, he called for Britain to be carried ahead by a ‘march of the makers’.
For many years, the leading study of the relationship between finance and 
growth was that by King and Levine (1993) who examined 80 countries in 
the 1960-1989 period. Their analysis showed a strong positive relationship 
between measures of financial development and economic development.17 
Their study also found financial development to be a good predictor of 
future economic growth. Subsequent papers bolstered the argument that 
both bank credit and stock market depth positively affected growth.18
But a few recent studies have contradicted the consensus. Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012) find a significant negative relationship between average 
credit-to-GDP ratios and economic growth for a panel of developed and 
emerging countries between 1980 and 2009. In a subsequent paper 
(Cecchetti and Kharroubi 2015), they find a negative relationship between 
credit growth and income growth.
An obvious reason for the discrepancy is the different time periods of the 
studies. Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows credit as a share of GDP in some of 
the largest economies in 1960-1989, the time frame of King and Levine 
(1993). Panel (b) shows the same indicator for the period 1980-2009, 
which is the one Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) consider.
17  King and Levine (1993) used private credit to GDP, financial liabilities to GDP and 
private bank assets as indicators of financial development; and per capita GDP growth, 
growth in the capital stock, investment and allocative efficiency as indicators of economic 
development.
18  See Levine (2005) for a review of those studies.
Does financial sector growth harm 
economic growth? 
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Figure 2(a). Domestic private credit as a percentage of GDP, selected 
countries, 1960-1989
Figure 2(b). Domestic private credit as a share of GDP, selected 
countries, 1980-2009
Source: World Bank
The 1990s and 2000s were decades of substantial expansion of private 
credit. Despite finding themselves at quite different levels of credit-to-GDP, 
all the developed countries in Figure 2 experienced strong credit growth in 
the 20 years to 2009 and ended the period at a much higher level. This is in 
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contrast to the stability in credit-to-GDP ratios observed in countries during 
most of the period analysed by King and Levine (1993). Even the country 
that shows the earliest steady increase in credit extension, Canada, only 
did so from the late 1970s.
Why is this significant? The later period saw capital markets liberalisation 
around the world, banking deregulation in many jurisdictions (see Martín-
Aceña 2013; Guiso et al. 2004) and, most notably, the advent of the single 
currency in many EU countries. Eleven out of the twenty countries studied 
in Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) are euro zone members, with all bar 
Greece having joined at the outset.
It is well known that euro membership altered capital flows between the 
member countries, spurring lending from the core (Germany, France and 
the Netherlands) to the periphery (Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland) (Lane 
2013). The effect of euro membership is thus potentially significant, yet 
the drivers of credit flows are complex and multiple. They may include 
mispricing due to declining nominal interest rates in the periphery, 
misallocation by politically influenced banks, and a belief by core country 
banks that periphery treasuries would not let borrowers fail. As these are 
factors distinct from credit growth, it is surprising that the impact of the euro 
was omitted as a variable in Cecchetti and Kharroubi’s (2015) regressions.
The authors highlight changes in credit growth and productivity growth in 
two countries, Spain and Ireland, and show a negative correlation. But both 
countries experienced large housing credit bubbles from the late 1990s, 
which in the case of Spain was largely driven by state-owned banks under 
political direction (Martín-Aceña 2013; IMF 2012). Even if one controls for 
real estate sector employment, as Cecchetti and Kharroubi do, we are left 
with a financial sector which was to a large extent not driven by market 
signals but political allocation. The drivers of the relationship between 
finance and growth in Spain’s case are likely to be distinct from those in 
more market-driven banking systems, such as Britain’s or Germany’s. 
Thus, credit growth may be more a symptom than a cause of growth-
depressing afflictions.
Indeed, in many respects the euro was transformative. Its adoption would 
be expected to increase capital flows due to much reduced transactions 
costs. It would increase the potential for credit growth as countries with 
higher levels of savings (such as Germany) could finance borrowing in 
other countries (such as Spain) more cheaply. One would therefore expect 
to see credit growth in a new single currency area. Even before the euro 
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was adopted, EU capital markets were integrating, a process that began in 
the 1980s. It just so happened that many (though not all) of the euro zone 
countries were also relatively slowly growing countries for reasons that had 
nothing to do with credit growth. 
Overall, we can conclude that this newer literature tells us little. There 
are too many variables changing simultaneously; different forms of credit 
will have different effects; the role of government in the credit system can 
sometimes be considerable; and credit can be artificially promoted by 
central bank monetary policy. 
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A key criticism of many who have argued that there is a problem with 
modern finance is that the financial sector is too big. This is frequently linked 
to an alleged rise in inequality.19 In the book by David Marquand mentioned 
earlier, the financial sector and its growth was strongly criticised. Marquand 
(2015) blamed the financial sector for inequality and rent-seeking, citing the 
US as being at the extreme end of a financialised economy. Marquand’s 
work was intended to be somewhat polemical, though his reputation has 
meant that it has been taken seriously as an academic study. In any 
case, more sophisticated analyses have made similar points to those of 
Marquand about the link between finance and inequality. For example, 
Denk and Cournede (2015), writing for the OECD, argue that the growth of 
the financial sector was a contributor to inequality, though this is explained 
to a large extent by the high levels of pay in the sector rather than any 
adverse impact on the poor. Turbeville (2015) has produced a very detailed 
analysis of the growth of finance in the US and concluded that the sector 
has been important in promoting inequality. Turbeville’s analysis suffers 
from focusing on one era in one country.  
Looking at international data, there does not seem to be any obvious 
relationship between the size of the financial sector and inequality. If 
Luxembourg is excluded as being a special case of a tiny country with a huge 
financial sector, the largest financial sectors in the world as a proportion of 
national income are in Switzerland, Australia, the Netherlands, the US, the 
UK, Iceland, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark, in that order (Tyler 2017).20 
In all these countries, the share of the financial sector is between 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent of GVA. The US is not at the extreme, as Marquand 
suggests. Furthermore, these countries are a mix of high-, medium- and 
19  Globally, inequality is falling, as it is in the UK although in about two-thirds of 
OECD countries, inequality is rising.
20  With the addition of Luxembourg, these countries made up the ten largest finan-
cial sectors as measured by gross valued added as a proportion of national income in 
2015.
Does the financial sector create 
inequality? 
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low-income inequality countries. Indeed, three of the OECD’s eight most 
equal countries are in this top ten list.
The OECD analysis of financialisation suggests that, in certain 
circumstances, the growth of the financial sector can raise inequality. 
There are reasons to take these results with a pinch of salt: they are only 
weakly statistically significant, and the regressions do not account for 
trends across countries which might have increased both inequality and 
credit extension, such as declining real interest rates since the mid-1990s.
Even with this caveat, it is worth considering the policy recommendations. 
One of them is that the sector should be required to hold high capital 
buffers, to which we would object for various reasons.21 However, its other 
two policy recommendations are that implicit subsidies should not be given 
to the financial sector and that tax systems should not artificially discourage 
the use of equity capital. These would be supported by anybody who 
believes in a genuinely liberalised financial sector. If the financial sector 
is encouraged by implicit subsidies – such as government guarantees 
and activities of central banks that effectively prevent bankruptcy and 
protect insiders – then we would expect the financial sector to have grown 
beyond the socially optimal size. However, the response to this should not 
be to attack the financial sector but to remove the subsidies so that the 
financial sector takes the full costs of its activity into account, as well as 
the benefits.22
21  For example, it would reduce the probability of failure, thus entrenching large 
established players within the sector. And it would impair lending, thereby reducing the 
trend growth rate.
22  See Lilico (2010) on how deposit insurance reform could reduce the implicit 
subsidy to banks. 
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Are complex financial instruments the 
real problem?
It is sometimes difficult to understand exactly what those who are criticising 
the financial sector object to. However, they are unlikely to object to life 
insurance or the provision of current account services or business lending.23 
Simply to make the case that finance is useful does not go far enough. We 
must also ask whether the market has somehow brought about an industry 
which produces complex products which have no social value.
Popular accounts of the causes of the financial crisis – such as the film The 
Big Short, based on the book of the same title – have promoted the notion 
that complex financial instruments and the trading related to them have no 
social use. Not only that, it is argued that they can actively harm society 
by imposing hidden risks on depositors and taxpayers if things go wrong, 
without any upside. Any derivative product with a three-letter acronym – 
such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS) – is now likely to arouse public 
suspicion. But this suspicion is misplaced, because these instruments are 
demonstrably valuable.
Securitisations, which were implicated in the financial crisis, provide 
opportunities for the diversification of risk and for the movement of risk 
outside the banking system. This was widely welcomed by central banks 
before the financial crisis (see, for example, Greenspan 2005). Furthermore, 
such instruments broaden considerably the range of investors who can 
finance different types of projects to the benefit both of users of capital 
(who obtain a lower cost of capital) and of savers. Individuals buying 
houses, for example, are likely to see lower costs of mortgage finance. The 
securitisation of housing loans or of loans that fund infrastructure provides 
opportunities for pension funds and life insurance companies, among 
others, to finance these activities which would otherwise be financed 
23  It is, however, the case that the FCA is currently looking at stricter regulation of 
bank overdraft charges as part of its review of high-cost credit (FCA 2016).
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through the banking sector. This enables those financial institutions to 
diversify risk and provide investors with relatively secure long-term returns 
which are higher, for example, than those from government bonds. 
The instruments listed above serve other important purposes. Mortgage-
backed securities bundle together residential housing loans, creating a 
liquid instrument which is diversified and can be sold on, thus freeing up 
capital for the originating bank to lend. Collateralised debt obligations are a 
more general form of this type of instrument, and they typically incorporate 
different tranches which offer different levels of risk. Finally, credit default 
swaps are a form of insurance which can help to make markets more 
stable in times of stress, as insurance is intended to do.
An account of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis is beyond the scope 
of this paper.24 However, it is important to record here why MBS and CDS 
caused problems for financial institutions. It was US government policy 
at that time to encourage home ownership, which led to over-issuance of 
mortgages and an increase in the eventual non-repayment rate. This policy 
also increased the rate of securitisations, and favourable risk-weighting 
of real estate loans by the international Basel regulations made them 
attractive for banks to hold (Kling 2009). Finally, because rating agencies 
are a government-sanctioned cartel which were encouraged by regulation 
to give higher ratings to securitised issues, the competitive incentive to 
give accurate assessments of the quality of mortgages was muted.
It should not be argued that market participants did not make mistakes: 
they did. One of the purposes of markets is to hold people to account for 
their mistakes. That this did not happen should be regarded as a failure of 
policy. But the view was widely shared that securitisation could spread risk 
round the financial system, as well as having the benefits cited above. For 
example, Paul Tucker, who was promoted to Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of England shortly after the crisis, said in a speech as late as April 2007: ‘So 
it would seem that there is a good deal to welcome in the greater dispersion 
of risk made possible by modern instruments, markets and institutions.’25 
Indeed there was good reason to welcome this trend. The financial crisis 
itself does not render the whole concept of securitisation or the derivative 
instruments based on such securities intrinsically problematic. 
24  One is available in Booth (ed.) (2009).
25  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/
qb070211.pdf 
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It was not the creation or existence, nor even the volume, of complex 
instruments which magnified the effects of the crash. Rather, it was the 
distorted signals that government policy gave market participants, together 
with a legal framework within which the banking system operated, that 
prevented banks and their financiers from suffering the losses caused by 
their mistakes.
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Is financial speculation self-serving 
and socially damaging?
Speculators have long been heaped with opprobrium. Pope Francis’s 
attack on commodity speculation noted above is one in a long line of 
critiques. Speculation is often associated with the use of derivative 
instruments such as futures, options and swaps and there has been a 
huge growth in the use of such instruments in the past few years, although 
data suggest a recent decline in such transactions, including in the UK. 
The total nominal outstanding in derivatives markets currently stands at 
over $1.2 quadrillion, though this vastly overstates the economic exposure 
because some positions aren’t exercised and many offset each other.
Critiques of speculation do not only come in polemical form. Nobel 
prize winning economist Robert Shiller (2017) describes common-place 
discussions of speculation in the US in the 1920s and 1930s. Nakrosis 
(2013) examines objections to speculation in moral theology. Discussion 
of the issues in moral theology goes back at least 800 years and probably 
further. Nakrosis’s conclusions are interesting, because he notes that 
speculation can have economically valuable effects and, in those 
cases, it should not be assumed to be morally wrong. However, even in 
circumstances where it is morally wrong, it does not follow that it should 
be made illegal or even made more difficult via regulation or taxes, if those 
we aim to protect would thereby be harmed. This applies in general to 
the regulation of finance. For example, if banning payday loans led some 
users to resort to loan sharks and expose themselves to much greater 
hazards it would not be prudent to implement a ban.
Following the 2009 financial crash, the Archbishop of York had strong words 
to say about speculators, commenting: ‘To a bystander like me, those who 
made £190 million deliberately underselling the shares of HBOS, in spite 
of its very strong capital base, and drove it into the bosom of Lloyds TSB 
Bank, are clearly bank robbers and asset strippers’. 
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Commentators often relate speculation to problems in the real economy 
that are faced by people trying to make a living from the production of 
non-financial goods and services. Pope Francis argued that speculation 
in financial instruments that is related to food markets led to higher prices 
which were allegedly necessary to deliver profits to the speculators.
In fact, it is difficult to think of any plausible mechanism by which prices 
can be driven ever-higher by speculation motivated by the desire for more 
profit. When commodity derivatives are traded, there are two sides to the 
trade. One side benefits from the price going up and the other side benefits 
from the price going down. There is no net gain from prices going up as 
far as the speculators are concerned, just a different distribution of gains 
between the different types of speculators. 
As is shown by Figure 3, food prices have not systematically risen as the 
availability and use of speculative instruments has increased. 
Figure 3. FAO Food Price Index, 1961-present
In real terms, food prices seem to be stabilising at lower levels, not higher 
levels. Of course, spikes occasionally occur due to natural or policy-related 
factors or a combination of both. In 2008, for example, the rush to bio-fuels 
reduced food supply (Swaminathan 2013).
There is, though, a separate and important question of whether speculation 
increases volatility in commodity prices. This might create pinch points 
where some people are unable to access food. This question will be 
discussed below.
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Speculation, derivatives and hedging – the example of food
Financial instruments can be used to manage risk by those operating in 
the real economy. This is not speculation as such, though the creation 
of the instruments may lead to or require speculators to create liquidity. 
For example, a farmer or a food processor might wish to buy or sell 
commodities they do not currently have in order to protect themselves 
against price changes that can be disruptive to their business. They can do 
that using derivatives. A farmer producing cocoa may wish to sell produce 
at a price that is fixed today before his crop is harvested. This is simply 
a form of insurance (hedging). In the same way, a processor might wish 
to buy cocoa at a price that is fixed in advance so they can develop their 
marketing strategy, fix price lists, and so on. 
Futures or forward contracts can develop to meet these needs. They exist 
in all sorts of markets and have existed since ancient times. However, 
if we leave it to farmers and processors to simply make arrangements 
between themselves, there are several disadvantages. There will be 
relatively few buyers and sellers of the contracts; both will be locked into 
contracts which might not turn out to be appropriate as situations change; 
the contracts will probably be expensive; one party will be at the risk of 
the other party failing financially; and so on. As a result of these risks and 
other obstacles, futures markets develop that allow buying and selling of 
forward interests, increasing efficiency and making prices more stable for 
producers. Furthermore, the use of financial instruments allows speculators 
to assume risks, and to pass them on, which might otherwise have been 
borne by vulnerable manufacturers and farmers. Speculators and others in 
financial markets can then diversify those risks.
From hedging to trading
Once such futures are developed, it is difficult to prevent people from 
buying and selling them even if they are not farmers, processors or others 
with an interest in insuring themselves against volatility in food prices. 
Indeed, the general availability of such instruments is important to ensure 
that the market is liquid. 
So, the question arises, does such trading in commodity futures cause 
problems in food markets? It is difficult to see how it could. 
The benefits of such instruments can be illustrated by an example. Assume 
that people expect a rise in the price of wheat by 50 per cent over six 
months and that the current price is now $100 per tonne. Let’s also assume 
that there is a futures contract available that allows a trader to agree today 
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a price at which they will buy a tonne of wheat in six months’ time. Given 
that the traders expect the wheat price to be $150 in six months’ time, it is 
highly likely that the futures contract will settle on a price of around $150. 
In six months’ time, the buyer of the future will have to buy a tonne of 
wheat from the seller of the future for $150.26 Assume a hedge fund buys 
that contract. Depending on the nature of the contract, in six months’ time, 
the hedge fund would pay $150 and receive an amount of money equal 
to the price of a tonne of wheat (in practice, the settlement and closing of 
the contract might be done differently). The buyer – or speculator – gains 
from any increase in the price of wheat above the price at which he bought 
the futures contract. This arrangement is not connected to the market for 
wheat: there is no mechanism that allows futures speculation to influence 
the underlying price of wheat in this example. The hedge fund has just 
taken a bet on the price of wheat. We may approve or disapprove of such 
bets, but the wheat market is unaffected.
Now assume there is speculation in the futures contract and a strong 
demand for the contract at the current price. The futures contract might now 
rise in price to $200. This means that, in six months, the buyer receives 
the difference between the price of a tonne of wheat and $200. If the price 
of wheat does not rise to 200 within six months those who have bought 
the future will make a loss and those who have sold it will make a profit. 
Perhaps this is what the Pope has in mind, though it should be noted, 
again, that there are two sides to the transaction. The question is whether 
this type of speculation can affect the price of wheat.
There are various ways in which the price of wheat can react to and follow 
the price of the future. In other words, there are ways in which speculation 
can drive up prices, at least in theory. For example, traders could somehow 
corner the market in wheat and withdraw it from the market in order to keep 
the price up so that they make profits on their futures contracts. In some 
circumstances this would be illegal, but it is, in fact, impossible in relation 
to the vast majority of commodities and there is no real evidence of it ever 
happening. In general, futures traders never have access to the underlying 
commodity and it would be very difficult to access sufficient quantities to 
affect the price. 
26  Certain practicalities have been omitted such as the treatment of interest and the 
fact that at the end of the contract settlement does not take place in such a ‘clunky’ way. 
In fact, the contract is designed so that the holder receives the difference between the 
price of a tonne of wheat and $150.
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Secondly, the speculation in the futures market might somehow affect 
decisions to produce wheat, thus driving up the price of the underlying 
commodity. However, such production decisions are likely to have the 
opposite effect. If farmers see that the futures price is high, it gives them 
an opportunity to lock in a high price for their produce today. They might 
be able to plant today and sell wheat futures to guarantee them the high 
price. But this should increase food production and therefore bring down 
food prices and reduce volatility in prices.
Lastly, farmers might store their wheat when the futures price is higher than 
the current price instead of bringing it to market immediately.27 They might 
do this because they could effectively lock in a price of $200 to be received 
in six months’ time by selling the wheat future. Most futures markets are in 
storable commodities and some, such as metals, can be stored indefinitely. 
So, if a farmer sees the wheat futures price at $200, he might sell the future 
and put the wheat in storage, thereby locking in the futures price. 
If there are people going hungry now, this might be thought a bad thing. 
However, in general, the effect is benign. The futures market facilitates the 
storage of commodities so that they can be sold at a time when there are 
shortages and higher prices. Although the person producing commodities 
is taking the wheat off the market now, he is bringing it back on to the 
market when the price is even higher. The futures market helps him to do 
that.
Financial speculation in commodities is likely to have the following 
effects. It will:
• Make it easier for farmers to get information about prices
• Make it easier and cheaper for them to manage their own  
 risk
• Leave farmers less exposed to price changes
All of this is especially true of poorer farmers, who without   
liquid futures markets would have no cheap way of obtaining price signals 
and reacting to them. 
And it could have the following effects:
• Encourage increases in production in times of shortage
• Encourage storage in times of relative surplus
27  This phenomenon is widespread enough in the oil market to have its own name: 
contango. See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/contango.asp
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The idea that speculation and derivatives in food and other commodities 
might reduce supply in times of shortage and increase volatility seems 
possible but implausible, and the evidence seems to back up the 
implausibility. As one study puts it: ‘In theory, feedback effects are 
possible; in practice, no empirical proof has been found. Studies show that 
in recent years, storage levels for soft commodities did not increase as 
prices rose. The levels stayed steady, or even dropped’.28 Price volatility in 
commodities where there are no futures markets (such as tungsten) has, 
in recent years, increased more than volatility in commodities where there 
are futures markets. 
The financialisation of commodities markets and the use of derivatives that 
are related to them could potentially lead to price spikes and increases in 
volatility at specific times. This might happen if information were unevenly 
distributed or if markets were operating inefficiently. However, the evidence 
for this is weak.29 Similar conclusions were drawn in a major study of oil 
market speculation. Though the possibility was left open that some forms 
of speculation were more damaging than others, no evidence was found 
for a causal link between financial markets and oil price rises (Fattouh et 
al. 2012).
Benefits from speculation
Returning to the ‘robber barons’ who short-sold bank shares, as it happens, 
this is one of the more obvious situations where speculation can bring 
significant benefits. If information is discovered that suggests a company is 
over-valued, for example in relation to the credit risk on a bank loan book, 
it is better that such information is reflected in the share price as quickly as 
possible so that action is taken. The main beneficiaries of a reduced ability 
to short-sell are those in board rooms whose mistakes go unpunished by 
markets for longer. As Copeland and Booth (2009) point out, if short-sellers 
had been more active when RBS announced plans to takeover ABN Amro, 
taxpayers might have been spared some of the costs of rescuing the bank 
in 2008.
The situations in which short-sellers can distort markets by forcing prices 
down to the extent that a firm may face bankruptcy are extremely limited 
and could only occur in specialist and illiquid markets. In liquid markets, 
if short-selling leads to lower share prices, other investors who disagree 
28  https://www.db.com/cr/en/concrete-Agricultural-speculation-and-commodity-
prices---is-there-a-link.htm
29  See https://www.db.com/cr/en/docs/zef_dp_161.pdf 
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with the short-sellers are likely to buy the stock. Short-sellers also provide 
greater liquidity in markets by ensuring that a greater volume of stock is 
available for those who wish to buy. There is widespread evidence for this, 
including during a period when the FSA banned short-selling during the 
financial crisis.30 Indeed, increased liquidity makes market manipulation 
more difficult and this is arguably a side-benefit of the development of 
derivatives and speculation. 
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of short-selling is its ability to bring 
an end to government policy that is causing damage by distorting markets. 
The most obvious example is the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis 
in 1992, when the short-selling of the pound allowed the over-valuation of 
sterling in the ERM to be exposed. This brought about an end to the ex-
treme monetary policy that was designed to prevent sterling from finding its 
proper market value. Following sterling’s exit, there were 61 consecutive 
quarters of economic growth. 
It can be argued that the creation of exchange rate regimes that are 
susceptible to such one-way bets is undesirable per se and that action 
taken by markets to undermine them is beneficial. However, at the very 
least, in these cases speculation acts to restore equilibrium exchange 
rates in a system where governments have taken actions that attempt to 
impose inconsistent policy environments that damage the real economy.
30  See: https://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/documents/short-selling-
restriction-market-quality-december-2008.pdf 
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Conclusion
The value of financial markets is under-appreciated. The ability of the 
financial services industry to enable important economic activity as a result 
of its role in reducing transaction costs is crucial to modern economic life. 
The sector does not exist only to serve the ‘real’ economy, as is often 
asserted. Financial services are important in their own right. The industry is 
particularly important for the less-well-off, for whom procuring the benefits 
that financial markets bring would be prohibitively expensive. The financial 
sector makes up around 7.5 per cent of the UK economy and around half 
of its output is exported, with the proceeds generally being used to finance 
the import of manufactured goods. The idea that finance dominates the 
economy cannot be sustained. However, the sector is extremely productive 
relative to other sectors of the economy and deliberate attempts to restrain 
its growth must effect overall productivity. 
The under-appreciation of finance is important as it makes it easier for 
politicians to justify policies that undermine the sector, as demonstrated 
during George Osborne’s tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Of course, serious critics of financial markets whose work is rooted in 
economics understand the value of the basic functions of the sector. 
Restating and explaining those functions is important, but insufficient. The 
more careful and detailed criticisms relate to whether the financial sector 
promotes inequality; whether it extracts value from the economy; whether 
the sector promotes short-termism; whether its products are worthwhile; 
and whether some of the activities of the sector are destabilising of the real 
economy. 
We have examined each of those claims and, at the very least, there are 
serious shortcomings in the arguments. Evidence is generally partial or non-
existent. In some cases, the evidence might be a little more compelling, but 
it is difficult to know what the obvious policy conclusions from this line of 
analysis would be. For example, it is suggested that because higher wages 
are paid in finance, the industry may exacerbate inequality. But, of course, 
this is likely to be true with many industries that tend to employ highly 
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qualified people. The sector may provide more employment opportunities 
for people with particular qualifications, but it is difficult to sustain an 
argument that this is a bad thing or that anybody suffers. 
This does not mean that the policy conclusions of some of those who criticise 
finance are wrong. Indeed, financial markets may well be incentivised to do 
the wrong things or do the right things badly or to develop structures that 
cause problems as a result of misguided regulatory and tax policy. There 
are policies which those who favour free financial markets would support 
and which would also command sympathy from those sceptical of financial 
markets. This is because some interventions in financial markets implicitly 
subsidise particular kinds of activity or skew it in a particular direction. 
For example, bank deposits carry a state guarantee which is effectively 
unlimited. This lowers banks’ cost of capital and will lead them to extend 
more credit than they would without state deposit insurance. It also 
reduces monitoring of the sector. Secondly, there is an implicit subsidy 
to large financial institutions if it is believed that their significance makes 
their potential failure an event to be avoided at all costs. This lowers the 
required return from creditors and investors, since the probability that they 
will lose their capital is reduced by the implicit bailout guarantee. This 
implicit subsidy will, in turn, encourage banks to grow bigger. Haldane 
(2012), speaking at the IEA’s Beesley Lectures, estimated the implicit 
subsidy provided by governments to the world’s largest banks at $70 billion 
annually between 2002 and 2007.31
It is generally suggested that this implicit subsidy is addressed by requiring 
banks and other financial institutions to have capital buffers such that 
they will hardly ever fail. However, this prevents effective competition 
and stops incumbents being undermined by new entrants. It would be 
better to demand a legal framework that allowed all financial institutions 
to be wound up safely if they failed. Progress has been made towards 
this. Sarin and Summers (2016) note that CDS spreads for the big global 
banks have stayed substantially above pre-crisis levels in the aftermath of 
the crash, which suggests there has been some reduction in the market’s 
perception of an implicit guarantee. However, this progress has clearly 
been insufficient given the continued regulatory obsession with ensuring 
that failures do not occur.
31  To estimate the implicit subsidy, Haldane used the difference between ‘stan-
dalone’ and ‘support’ credit ratings.
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The experience of the financial crisis points to other policy reforms. The 
US government should not underwrite securitised housing debt and, more 
generally, should play no part in the housing finance market. We should 
also remove the tax discrimination against equity finance, an issue that 
was mentioned in Vickers (2011: 81). The Kay Review (Kay 2012) also 
cited tax discrimination against equity investment as a problem in modern 
financial markets, as well as suggesting that regulations surrounding 
insurance company and pension fund capital were problematic. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion is that it is important for critics 
of the present operation of financial markets to understand the dynamic 
nature of competition. The question we should ask ourselves is not whether 
markets produce outcomes that reflect the perfect competition model of 
textbooks. The most important questions are different. Firstly, we need to 
consider whether the market process leads firms to respond to changes 
in consumer demands over time. Secondly, we need to ask whether other 
ways of organising economic activity in the financial sector are more 
effective. Certainly, there is no evidence from the crash or the period since 
that the spawning of new regulations or the detailed involvement of the 
state in the banking system leads to better results. 
It is careless for people in positions of influence to disparage financial 
services without adequate empirical evidence. Suspicion of finance has 
over the centuries led to interventions – such as bans or ceilings on 
interest, limits to banks’ balance sheet and geographic expansion, and 
statutory prohibitions of certain forms of trading – which have made people 
worse off. At the same time, a lack of understanding of the implications 
of certain policies – such as mortgage loan subsidies, deposit insurance, 
and officially sanctioned credit ratings – has often destabilised the financial 
system, with long-standing damage to people’s savings and business 
activity. 
As household wealth and individual lifespans increase, finance will only 
become more important. Unless those who make policies dispense with 
unwarranted prejudice against it, the recent history of financial instability 
is bound to be repeated. And, at the same time, modern economies will 
not benefit as they could from the immense social contribution that a 
diversified, sophisticated and dynamic financial system can deliver.
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